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Abstract 
 
  Historically, plaintiffs injured by allegedly defective medical devices were able to 
bring tort suits against manufacturers in state court.  With the passage of the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”) – a federal law containing an express preemption clause – 
many wondered whether such lawsuits would still be viable.  Courts, FDA, device 
manufacturers, and the public alike have struggled to understand the scope of federal 
preemption under the new regime.  This paper documents that struggle, beginning with the 
passage of the MDA in 1976.  It then focuses on the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling on the 
issue twenty years later in Medtronic v. Lohr.  It discusses the evolution of MDA preemption 
doctrine in the post-Lohr decade, and then addresses the Court’s most recent word on the 
subject – Medtronic v. Riegel.  The paper concludes with a description of the most current 
understanding of federal preemption under the MDA and implications for the future of the 
field. 
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Introduction 
 
  Imagine two characters awake late at night on February 19, 2008.  One, Jane Doe, is 
the in-house counsel for Acme, a major medical device manufacturer.  The company has been 
manufacturing artificial joints for years, and the products have improved the lives of 
countless patients.  Unfortunately, some patients have had trouble with the joints, and are 
suing the company for allegedly defective design.  The other person is John Doe, a hospital 
patient awaiting surgery to remove a faulty artificial hip joint manufactured by Acme.  He is 
exhausted, in pain, and outraged that he has to undergo another invasive procedure.  His 
physicians have told him that his synthetic joint was defective to start with, and he wants to 
hold someone accountable for his suffering. 
  What Jane suspects, and what John likely does not, is that the next day will change 
both their futures.  The pending lawsuits against Jane’s company are about to disappear, and 
John’s ability to sue is about to be radically undercut.  On February 20, 2008, the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in the medical device-related case, Medtronic v. Riegel, and the 
litigation landscape may never look the same again. 
  Before launching into how Medtronic v. Riegel changed product liability in the field 
of medical devices, let us return to John’s predicament to see why this case would affect him 
at all.  John’s artificial joint is a medical device regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”).  John had the joint implanted months ago after his own hip joint 
had deteriorated from age.  Unfortunately, the synthetic plastics in the joint degraded rapidly 
and the mechanism became irreparably deformed.  John was left in a great deal of pain, and 
the only real solution was to surgically remove and replace the faulty joint.  John is 
understandably upset, and he decides to sue Acme for his injury in a Massachusetts court.  
This is where things get complicated.   Preemption under the MDA
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  Whether a medical device defect claim can be successfully litigated in state court 
depends on a host of factors, including: the nature of the claim, the type of device, the means 
by which the device was examined by FDA before being commercially marketed, and the 
controlling judicial understanding of federal preemption at the time.  The final factor is 
probably the most crucial in determining the fate of John’s suit, and it is the most 
comprehensive, as it relies on an analysis of all the others.   
  Our understanding of the scope of federal preemption of state tort suits in the domain 
of medical devices has changed over time.  In the early days of FDA regulation, not much 
attention was paid to devices, as compared to food or drugs.  States were fairly free to deal 
with the production and sale of medical devices as they saw fit.  With time and technological 
advances, medical devices grew more complex and potentially more dangerous.  In response 
to growing concerns about consumer safety, FDA and Congress began to regulate more 
rigorously, setting up a regime in which federal regulation occupied the front line in the war 
against dangerous devices.  Because this represented a shift in the regulatory balance from 
states to the federal government, it took some time to shape the contours of each system’s 
powers.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, it seemed clear that some forms of state 
regulation would be pre-empted by federal law, but the precise reach of preemption would 
take decades to determine. 
  Perhaps the two most important preemption decisions in the medical device litigation 
realm are the Supreme Court juggernauts, Medtronic v. Lohr and Medtronic v. Riegel.  Both 
cases came on the heels of years of inconsistent decisions in the district and Circuit courts.  
Each case served to clarify pre-existing misconceptions, while at the same time raising brand 
new questions.  This paper will provide a brief history of our understanding of federal 
preemption in the field of medical device litigation, and it will pay particular attention to the 
two landmark Medtronic rulings.  Part I of the paper will provide an overview of the   Preemption under the MDA
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regulation of medical devices in United States history, ending with the enactment of the 
statute that remains at the heart of the preemption debate: The Medical Device Amendments 
of 1976 (“MDA”).  Part II will discuss Medtronic v. Lohr, the first Supreme Court case to 
tackle the subject of federal preemption under the MDA.  Part III will delve into what the 
preemption landscape looked like in the post-Lohr era.  It will explore the gaps left by the 
Lohr decision and how courts and FDA attempted, and failed, to fill them.  Part IV will 
discuss the Court’s latest word on preemption: Medtronic v. Riegel.  Part V will discuss the 
potential impact of the Riegel decision and what the most current understanding of federal 
preemption under the MDA seems to be.  The paper will conclude with implications for the 
future of product liability litigation in the field of medical devices. 
 
Part I: A Brief History of Medical Device Regulation 
 
 
  The regulation of medical devices in the United States does not have much history to 
speak of until 1938.
1  Although Congress passed laws addressing the problem of adulterated 
or misbranded foods and drugs as early as 1906,
2 it took the federal government three more 
decades to address medical devices.  In the late 1930s, Congress broadened its 1906 Act to 
encompass devices, and the resulting legislation was the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).
3  The FDCA granted FDA power to prohibit adulteration or 
misbranding of medical devices that traveled in interstate commerce.  After the passage of the 
                                                 
1 BRADLEY MERRILL THOMPSON, FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (1995). 
2 Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 59 Pub. L. No. 384; 34 Stat. 768 (1906).  1906 also 
ushered in the “modern era” of FDA because the Act added regulatory functions to the 
agency’s previous purpose of scientific inquiry.  John P. Swann, History of the FDA (adapted 
from A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (George Kurian, ed., Oxford 
University Press, 1998)), http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2008). 
3 75 Pub. L. No. 717; 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).   Preemption under the MDA
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Act, however, “quack” devices still proliferated.
4  As the decades passed, more complex 
devices were invented, including pacemakers, heart valves, dialysis machines, and a host of 
other products that posed new dangers to consumers.
5  Under the FDCA, FDA was generally 
able to remove dangerous devices from the market, but it did not have the ability to engage in 
pre-market review.  In order to best protect consumers from these new and untested 
technologies, FDA asked Congress to expand its authority.
6 
  In the 1970s, under the Nixon Administration, the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare convened a study group to investigate the need for more stringent medical device 
controls.  The group was called the Cooper Committee,
7 and it discovered that medical 
devices had led to numerous injuries and deaths.
8  The Committee’s suggestions about 
creating a classification system, promulgating standards for the production of devices, and 
engaging in pre-market safety review heavily influenced legislative action.
9  Congress was 
also acutely aware of many high-profile medical device failures, such as that of the Dalkon 
Shield.
10  It responded to the growing crisis with the enactment of the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”),
11 and this ushered in the modern era of device regulation.
12   
                                                 
4 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government 
Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 
102, 105 (1989)). 
5 PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
969 (3d ed. 2007) (citing H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1975)). 
6 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 5. 
7 The group was headed by Dr. Theodore Cooper, Director of the National Heart and Lung 
Institute, and most of its members were government representatives.  Id. at 6. 
8 Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of 
Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2129 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
9 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 979 (citing STUDY GROUP ON MED. 
DEVICES, DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, MEDICAL DEVICES: A LEGISLATIVE PLAN 
(1970)). 
10 The Dalkon Shield was a widely-used intrauterine device (“IUD”) that had been placed on 
the market in 1970 and that was later linked to infections, miscarriages and deaths.  See, e.g. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8 (1976) (“Significant defects in cardiac pacemakers have 
necessitated 34 voluntary recalls of pacemakers, involving 23,000 units, since 1972.”); S. 
REP. NO. 94-33, at 6 (1975) (“Some 10,000 injuries were recorded, of which 731 resulted in   Preemption under the MDA
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  The MDA expanded the scope of FDA’s authority in significant ways.  The most 
important changes for the purpose of this paper are those pertaining to device classification, 
pre-market review, and federal preemption. 
 
(A) Device Classification under the MDA 
 
  Under the MDA, medical devices are categorized into three classes, each defined by 
the “type of regulation that is necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of products in 
that category.”
13  Class I devices are items such as tongue depressors, bandages, and 
bedpans.
14  They pose the least risk to consumers, and thus, the “general controls” of the 
MDA are sufficient to assure their safety and effectiveness.
15  Class II devices are products 
such as syringes, hearing aids, and resuscitation equipment.  This category contains devices 
that are potentially more harmful to consumers, and FDA requires more than just compliance 
with general controls to ensure safety and effectiveness.
16  Manufacturers of these devices 
must comply with federal performance standards known as “special controls.”
17  Finally, 
Class III devices are those that pose the highest risk;
18 they are products such as pacemakers, 
IUDs, artificial hearts, and artificial joints.  These are subject to the strictest type of 
regulatory requirement; they must undergo a pre-market review process in which FDA 
                                                                                                                                                        
death.  For example, 512 deaths and 300 injuries were attributed to heart valves; 89 deaths 
and 186 injuries to heart pacemakers; 10 deaths and 8,000 injuries to intrauterine devices.”); 
122 Cong. Rec. 5859 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) (“A 10-year FDA death-certificate 
search found over 850 deaths tied directly to medical devices.”). 
11 94 Pub. L. No. 295; 90 Stat. 539 (1976).   
12 See Green & Schultz, supra note 8, at 2129-31.   
13 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 41. 
14 Id.  
15 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2000).  Note that statutory references in this paper are generally 
to the United States Code.  In certain cases, where relevant, a parallel citation to the FDCA 
will be given as well.  
16 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 42. 
17 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
18 Class III devices are those that either “present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury” or are “purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life 
or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health.”  
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2000).   Preemption under the MDA
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inspects valid scientific evidence of their safety and effectiveness.
19  Class III devices are the 
focus of this paper because they are the most stringently regulated by FDA, and this places 
them at the heart of product liability lawsuits and the federal preemption debate. 
 
(B) Pre-market Review of Class III Devices 
 
  In order to sell a Class III medical device on the market, a manufacturer must provide 
FDA with a “reasonable assurance” that its product is safe and effective.
20  Strictly speaking, 
this entails a fairly intensive procedure referred to as “premarket approval” (“PMA”).
21  
PMA is a “rigorous process” in which manufacturers supply FDA with detailed safety and 
efficacy data.
22  However, when the MDA went into effect, Congress knew that it would
both impracticable and undesirable to subject all pre-amendment Class III devices to PMA 
review.  Certainly it would have dealt a devastating blow to many perfectly safe and well-
established devices, as they would all have to have been pulled from the market until FDA 
completed its lengthy reviews.  At the same time, it would have been unfair if the PMA 
process was only required for post-amendment devices.  Older products would have been 
able to remain on the market and would-be entrants would have been hampered in their 
ability to compete, even if their products were essentially the same as some of the pre-
amendment devices.
 be 
MDA regulatory regimes,
24 FDA permitted Class III devices some alternate modes of entry 
arket.
25 
23  In order to facilitate a smooth transition between the pre- and post-
into (or permission to remain on) the m
                                                 
19 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 42. 
20 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (2000). 
21 The information that a manufacturer must submit to FDA in a PMA application in order to 
CA § 515(c).   
, 
 subsequent laws have made changes to the 
gain approval is detailed in 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c) (2000); FD
22 Scott W. Sayler & Steven M. Thomas, Post-Decision Diagnosis: Medical Device 
Preemption Alive and Mostly Well After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 185
186 (1997). 
23 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 987-88. 
24 There have been medical device-related amendments since 1976, such as the Safe Medical 
Devices Act of 1990 (“SMDA”).  While these  Preemption under the MDA
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 Sections  513(f)(1)(A)
26 and 515(b)(1)
27 of the MDA granted pre-amendment Class II
devices and po
I 
st-amendment Class III devices that were substantially equivalent to pre-
ess 
 it is 
iggy-
    
amendment Class III devices an exemption from the PMA process.
28  Pre-amendment devices 
could thus remain on the market, and substantially equivalent new devices could gain acc
to the market easily through an abbreviated review.  If a Class III device produced today is 
“substantially equivalent” to a pre-existing device, the product can be marketed without 
undergoing PMA provided that the manufacturer submits a “premarket notification” 
(“PMN”) to FDA.
29  This is commonly referred to as the “section 510(k) process,”
30 and
the simplest route for a Class III device to get onto the market.
31  FDA also permits “p
                                                                                                                                                     
Thus, when I make reference to the post-1976 regulatory scheme, I do not mean to suggest 
that all modern regulations were codified in the original MDA, and I will provide citations to 
updated statutory provisions where relevant. 
regulatory scheme, a detailed exploration of their impact is beyond the scope of this paper.  
25 One mode of Class III device exemption that will not be discussed in detail in this paper is 
the Investigational Device Exemption (“IDE”).  Because Congress wanted to encourage “the 
discovery and development of useful devices,” this exemption allows some Class III products 
that are still under development to reach the market.  21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1) (2000); FDCA § 
520(g)(1).  FDA grants permission for use of these devices in clinical investigations. See 21 
U.S.C. § 360j(g)(2)(A) (2000); FDCA § 520(g)(2)(A).   
26 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A) (2000). 
27 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1) (2000). 
28 Even though FDA “grandfathered” in pre-1976 devices and allowed post-1976 devices a 
shortcut onto the market, the agency still reserved the right to promulgate regulations 
triggering approval requirements for a specific category of device.  If FDA determined that it 
wanted to review safety and efficacy of a particular category of Class III device, it would 
promulgate regulations notifying the manufacturers that they needed to submit PMA 
applications.  This call for PMAs would also apply to any post-amendment products that had 
entered the market by virtue of being “substantially similar” to the pre-amendment category 
under review.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 988. 
29 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2000); FDCA § 510(k). 
30 It is so called after the pertinent section in the original Act, FDCA § 510(k); 21 U.S.C. § 
360(k) (2000).  Medical devices that are approved for sale in this manner are sometimes 
called “510(k) devices.”  Sayler & Thomas, supra note 22, at 187. 
31 Section 510(k) submissions require less information from the manufacturer, are statistically 
more likely to be approved by FDA, and by law, must be completed more quickly than 
PMAs.  FDA has 90 days by statute to respond to a section 510(k) notification and 180 days 
to respond to a PMA.  Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket 
Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 510, 515-18 
(1984).   Preemption under the MDA
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backing,” or the approval of a new device based on its substantial equivalence to another 
post-amendment device that was itself approved pursuant to the section 510(k) process.
32   
  The PMA application has been described as a “voluminous and detailed 
submission”
33 and it involves review of copious information regarding device safety and 
efficacy.  Conversely, the section 510(k) process is much shorter and does not always include 
clinical data.
34  While FDA takes an average of 1,200 hours to complete a PMA review, it 
completes a section 510(k) review in only about 20 hours.
35  Most Class III devices have 
been subjected to section 510(k) review only, and this still remains the dominant mode of 
market entry.
36 
  The distinctions between PMA and section 510(k) review are critical to the federal 
preemption debate because the former process bespeaks significant federal regulation while 
the latter is comparatively cursory.  Since the principal debate in federal preemption is 
whether state laws and regulations should be subjugated to federal ones, a detailed 
consideration of the method of pre-market review is necessary to determine whether the 
federal government may be said to be “regulating” a product at all. 
 
(C) Preemption under the MDA 
 
  In order to fill the void that existed in the absence of federal regulation before the 
MDA was enacted, some states passed legislation to protect their consumers from medical 
devices.  For example, California – in response to the Dalkon Shield tragedy – had passed 
laws requiring state pre-market approval for IUDs, and New Jersey had laws regulating 
                                                 
32 Green & Schultz, supra note 8, at 2135. 
33 Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509, 550 (1996) (citing Edward M. 
Basile, Using the Product Approval Process to Protect Market Share: What are the Risks and 
Benefits, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 165, 166 (1989)). 
34 Id. at 550 (citing Edward M. Basile, Using the Product Approval Process to Protect 
Market Share: What are the Risks and Benefits, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 165, 165 (1989)). 
35 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 479 (1996) (citation omitted). 
36 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 992.    Preemption under the MDA
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hearing aids.
37  When Congress enacted the MDA, it recognized that conflicting state and 
federal requirements would unduly burden the interstate trade of medical devices.
38  
Therefore, the MDA was drafted with an express preemption clause, enabling federal 
regulation to trump state regulation of medical devices. 
  Rather than delineating the contours of the new divide between the state and federal 
device regulatory regimes, however, the MDA preemption clause became a source of 
vigorous debate.  The following paragraphs will discuss the preemption clause and its 
ambiguities, and illustrate early understanding (or misunderstanding) of how federal 
preemption was meant to operate. 
  The preemption clause of the MDA states, in relevant part, that: 
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect 
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement – (1) which 
is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this 
chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the 
device under this chapter.
39 
 
  The clause appears to be an express Congressional mandate that federal regulations 
will trump state regulations in the realm of medical device law.
40  Federal preemption of state 
law is a principle that derives from the Supremacy Clause within Article VI of the 
Constitution.  Stated simply, when state law comes into conflict with federal law, federal law 
will supersede.
41  This might seem to conflict with the traditional notion of state sovereignty.  
To protect the power of the states, therefore, courts have adopted a presumption against 
                                                 
37 David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 104 (2005) 
(citations omitted). 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 45 (1976). 
39 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) (2000); FDCA § 521(a). 
40 Note that the Act allows FDA to explicitly grant exemptions to state requirements that 
would otherwise be preempted by the MDA, and the process by which it does this is 
governed by 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2006). 
41 Article VI establishes the law of the United States as “the supreme Law of the Land…any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.    Preemption under the MDA
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preemption of state police power regulations in the absence of clear Congressional intent.
42  
In this paper, our major question is whether the MDA was intended to preempt state 
common-law tort actions, like the one our John Doe wants to bring. 
  To determine whether state common-law tort claims are preempted by an express 
preemption clause, courts will first examine the language of the statute.  At a glance, the text 
may seem clear, but it is actually rife with ambiguities that incited great debate within the 
judiciary.  First, and most crucially, what does “requirement” mean?  The MDA’s preemptive 
power only operates in the face of state “requirements.”  This could refer only to “positive 
state law – that is, commands imposed by state statutes or duly promulgated state regulations 
that carry the force of law.”
43  Conversely, the term may be read more broadly, encompassing 
“state tort and damages law, which, through serial jury verdicts, could also be said to impose 
‘requirements.’”
44  The interpretation of this one word means a world of difference for 
consumers or manufacturers.  The narrower reading would allow injured consumers greater 
access to state courts and they could sue manufacturers for violations of common-law duties.  
The broader reading could virtually immunize manufacturers from being haled into state 
courts.  This crucial inquiry is at the heart of preemption cases even outside the scope of the 
MDA, but it is especially the focus of the two Class III medical device cases that will be 
discussed at length in this paper – Medtronic v. Lohr and Medtronic v. Riegel.   
  An understanding of the word “requirement” is just not important in terms of 
assessing the state regulation in question.  Recall that federal preemption only operates when 
state regulations differ from “any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device.”  
Are PMA review and its abbreviated counterpart in section 510(k) on equal footing as federal 
                                                 
42 The Supreme Court “start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
43 Vladeck, supra note 37, at 98. 
44 Id.   Preemption under the MDA
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“requirements” applicable to medical devices under the MDA?  As it would later turn out, the 
difference between these two processes would have a huge impact on the scope of federal 
preemption.  
  There is some obscurity inherent in the use of the “different from, or in addition to” 
language.  A functionalist reading might counsel extending the MDA’s preemptive reach 
when state requirements attempt to impose more stringent regulations on a medical device, or 
when it would be impossible for a manufacturer to comply with both federal and state 
regulations.  However, a literalist would say that state requirements are preempted even when 
they require less than federal law does, because this would theoretically make the state 
requirements “different from” the federal regime. 
  Finally, how do we determine when a state requirement “relates to the safety or 
effectiveness” of a medical device?  Narrowly read, this could mean that the state 
requirement must specifically address the device or the category of medical devices.  If read 
broadly, however, even a state requirement that applies generally, such as a duty sounding in 
tort or property, could be viewed as “relating to” devices if it happened to sweep medical 
devices into its reach.   
   Before we delve into how courts attempted to resolve these disputes, let us examine 
how Congress and FDA viewed the scope of MDA preemption.  
(i)  Scope of Preemption: Congressional Intent  
  
  Because of the strong presumption against federal preemption in the absence of clear 
Congressional intent, it is important to consider what Congress actually wanted the scope of 
the MDA preemption clause to be when it was drafted.  The existence of an express 
preemption clause indicates that the federal government did intend to preempt at least some 
conflicting state or local regulatory measures.   
  The legislative history that accompanied the MDA briefly discussed the preemption   Preemption under the MDA
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provision, saying that “if a substantial number of differing requirements applicable to a 
medical device [were] imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal Government, interstate 
commerce would be unduly burdened.”
45  This strongly suggested that Congress intended to 
unify and standardize the regulation of medical devices under the federal scheme.    
  At the same time, however, Congress did explicitly authorize FDA to grant 
exemptions from federal preemption to some state and local regulations,
46 and this indicates 
that some overlap between state and federal regulation of devices was tolerable.  In the 
legislative history of the MDA, it seemed apparent that Congress “sought to prevent medical 
device manufacturers from being exposed to conflicting requirements by the states and the 
federal government,” but that state requirements could be exempted from preemption 
provided that they were “compatible with the federal regulatory scheme.”
47 
  The major question that went unanswered both in the text of the preemption clause 
and in the legislative history accompanying it was: how did Congress intend to treat state tort 
actions?  Prior to the enactment of the MDA, injured individuals could and did bring state 
law damages actions against medical device manufacturers.  Indeed, the sheer magnitude of 
state tort claims filed against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield drove the company into 
bankruptcy.
48  Congress was thus certainly aware of the existence and prevalence of state tort 
litigation over medical devices when it drafted the MDA.  Does its silence suggest that it 
intended to leave state tort law as a permissible status quo?  Or would it have explicitly 
addressed this in the House and Senate Reports if it intended to save such claims from 
preemption?   
  Consider also the fact that the MDA contains a “savings clause,” which provides that:  
                                                 
45 Carrier, supra note 33, at 551 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 45 (1976)). 
46 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (2000); FDCA § 521(b). 
47 Carrier, supra note 33, at 552. 
48 Vladeck, supra note 37, at 103 (internal citation omitted).   Preemption under the MDA
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“[c]ompliance with an order issued under this section shall not relieve any 
person from liability under Federal or State law. In awarding damages for 
economic loss in an action brought for the enforcement of any such liability, 
the value to the plaintiff in such action of any remedy provided him under 
such order shall be taken into account.”
49   
 
Although this clause is not found in the same section as the preemption provision, there are 
commentators who believe that its language, especially the reference to damages being 
awarded for economic loss, suggests that Congress did not intend to preempt all common-law 
actions.
50 
(ii) Scope of Preemption: FDA Interpretation 
 
  Despite the absence of clear Congressional intent in either the statute or the 
accompanying legislative history, we do have some evidence of what the agency charged 
with enforcing the MDA thought the scope of preemption would be.  After the MDA was 
enacted, FDA promulgated regulations governing the preemption clause and detailing how 
states and localities could petition for exemptions.
51  In the language of its regulations, FDA 
clarified the “any requirement” wording of the preemption clause as follows: 
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect 
any requirement with respect to a medical device intended for human use 
having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or court decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable to such device under any provision of the act and 
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under the act.
52 
 
  This language, on its face, would seem to suggest that state tort remedies would be 
preempted under the MDA because they generate “court decisions.”  However, FDA did not 
mean the language to be read so literally.  Rather, the term “‘court decision’…apparently was 
intended only to address ‘judicial . . . interpretations’ of the relevant ‘statute, rule, or 
                                                 
49 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (2000); FDCA § 518(d). 
50 Roger W. Bivans, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State Common-Law 
Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (1996). 
51 43 Fed. Reg. 18,665 (May 2, 1978) (final rule amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 67,336 (Oct. 10, 
1980) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 808.1) (1994)). 
52 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994) (emphasis added).   Preemption under the MDA
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regulation.’”
53  The agency’s primary concern was not that a court decision would constitute 
a “requirement,” but instead that a court would interpret pre-existing, permissible state or 
local requirements in such a way that would bring them into conflict with federal regulation.  
FDA also explicitly stated that the MDA would not preempt state or local requirements “of 
general applicability that relate only incidentally to medical devices . . . [such as] the Uniform 
Commercial Code warranty requirements.”
54  Commentators have interpreted the FDA’s 
position to mean that common-law tort awards were similarly not preempted
55 even though 
the agency’s choice of language to communicate that may have been “unfortunate.”
56 
  The FDA regulations also illustrate that the agency thought state and local regulations 
were preempted “only when [FDA] has established specific counterpart regulations or there 
are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making 
any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or 
in addition to, the specific [FDA] requirements.”
57  This is an important aspect because it 
means that the MDA preemption clause would only operate when a given device was subject 
to regulations promulgated by FDA.  This hearkens back to the debate over what level of 
regulation counts as an FDA “requirement” – another issue with which courts would struggle. 
(iii) Scope of Preemption: The Courts Speak 
 
  In short, the MDA preemption clause had broad, ambiguous language that could be 
read to preempt state common-law tort actions.  Congressional intent was difficult to discern 
from the record.  The FDA regulations interpreting the MDA could easily be read to support 
preemption of state tort cases, even though FDA insisted it did not interpret the statute as 
such.  In spite of (or perhaps because of!) FDA’s oddly worded regulations, the late 1980s 
                                                 
53 Carrier, supra note 33, at 553 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 30,383, 30,385 (June 14, 1977) 
(preamble to the proposed rule)) (emphasis added). 
54 42 Fed. Reg. 30,834 (June 14, 1977). 
55 See, e.g. Vladeck, supra note 37, at 123; Carrier, supra note 33, at 553. 
56 See, e.g. Carrier, supra note 33, at 553. 
57 Id. at 554 (citing 1 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)).   Preemption under the MDA
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and early 1990s generated high-profile court cases that found state tort awards to be 
preempted by the MDA.
58  At the same time, this viewpoint was not the clear consensus 
within the judiciary, and preemption defenses were rare.
59  For many years, the Supreme 
Court generally hesitated to find that federal public safety statutes preempted state tort law 
actions.
60  The Court also expressed that the “regulation of health and safety [was] 
historically an aspect of state police powers and thus a local concern.”
61  Prior to 1992, 
therefore, the lower courts were mired in confusion about exactly how broad preemption 
under the MDA was really intended to be.  It was the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone 
v. Liggett Group
62 that finally opened the floodgates.
63 
  In 1992, the Cipollone Court addressed the preemption debate under a different 
federal statutory scheme – the Public Health Cigarette Acts of 1965 and 1969.
64  This field 
shared one key trait with the MDA – the use of the term “requirements” in a statutory 
provision that expressly preempted state law.
65  In interpreting this crucial word, the Court 
adopted a very broad reading that encompassed more than positive law.  They held that the 
“phrase ‘no requirement…’ sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive 
                                                 
58 See Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.In. 1988); Moore v. 
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing language in FDA regulations to 
support the interpretation that the term “any requirement” as used in the preemption clause of 
the MDA includes court decisions).   
59 Vladeck, supra note 37, at 106. 
60 See, e.g. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 484 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding that even though 
Congress had occupied the field of nuclear safety, a state damages award for injuries suffered 
when plutonium escaped from a federally licensed power plant was not preempted).  See also 
Robert Adler & Richard Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 
MO. L. REV. 895, 914 (1994) (noting courts’ traditional caution in finding preemption of tort 
claims). 
61 James P. Walsh, Niehoff v. Surgidev Corp.: No Preemption of Kentucky Tort Law Claims 
by the Federal Medical Device Amendments, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 615, 624-25 (1998) (citing 
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)). 
62 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
63 Prior to the case, it was a rarity for device manufacturers to raise preemption defenses in 
state tort suits; afterwards, they did so routinely.  Vladeck, supra note 37, at 106. 
64 15 U.S.C. 1331 – 1340. 
65 The 1969 Act referred to “requirements or prohibitions…imposed under State law.”  
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (quoting § 5(b) of the 1969 Act).   Preemption under the MDA
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enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that 
take the form of common-law rules.”
66  This holding opened the door for a very broad 
reading of preemption under the MDA and thus “unleashed a torrent of preemption 
litigation.”
67  The use of the preemption defense in the lower courts became routine.
68   
 After  Cipollone, state and federal courts were fairly unanimous in finding that tort 
claims brought by plaintiffs allegedly injured by medical devices were preempted under the 
MDA’s express preemption clause.
69  Most of these courts reasoned that because the MDA 
preemption clause contained the same “requirements” language as that of the federal statute 
in Cipollone, then state law tort claims which imposed requirements “different from, or in 
addition to”
70 federal requirements for medical devices were clearly preempted.
71  A handful 
of courts, however “refused to construe the MDA’s preemption provision so broadly and 
found that only some state law claims were preempted, or even that no claims were 
preempted at all.”
72   
  Because of the conflict surrounding the preemptive scope of the MDA, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to an Eleventh Circuit case in 1996,
73 and the resulting decision 
                                                 
66 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521. 
67 Vladeck, supra note 37, at 106. 
68 Id. 
69 Walsh, supra note 61, at 627 (citing Robert Adler & Richard Mann, Preemption and 
Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 917 n.108 (1994)) (noting the 
unanimous post-Cipollone finding of preemption among the courts, and citing numerous 
cases).  
70 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). 
71 See Connelly v. Iolab Corp., 927 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Mo.1996) (discussing Cipollone 
analysis and noting federal appellate court cases which followed the Cipollone definition of 
requirements to hold that the MDA preempted most state common-law claims). 
72 Walsh, supra note 61, at 628 (citations omitted).  See Anne-Marie Dega, The Battle over 
Medical Device Regulation: Do the Federal Medical Device Amendments Preempt State Tort 
Law Claims? 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 615, 639-47 (1996) (discussing minority partial 
preemption and no preemption court decisions and citing several cases). 
73 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part.   Preemption under the MDA
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would become a controlling precedent in the field of medical device litigation.  This case was 
Medtronic v. Lohr.
74 
  
Part II: Medtronic v. Lohr 
 
 
 In  Medtronic v. Lohr, the Supreme Court addressed the specific issue of federal 
preemption of state tort suits involving Class III medical devices under the MDA.   
  Lora Lohr was a cardiac patient in need of a pacemaker.  In 1987, she was implanted 
with a Medtronic device that contained one of the company’s Model 4011 pacemaker leads.
75 
Medtronic had taken advantage of FDA’s expedited section 510(k) process when it 
introduced the Model 4011 lead onto the market.  The lead was approved because it was 
“substantially equivalent” to devices already being lawfully sold.  A few years after Lohr 
received the pacemaker, the device failed, resulting in a cardiac crisis that led to emergency 
surgery.  Lohr’s physician attributed the failure to a defect in the lead.
76  Lohr and her 
husband filed a complaint containing a negligence count and a strict liability count in Florida 
state court.
77   
  The Lohrs alleged that Medtronic was negligent in the design, manufacture, and sale 
of the pacemaker.  To support their strict liability claim, they argued that the device was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale.
78  
Medtronic removed the case to federal district court and moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that the Lohrs’ claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) – the MDA 
preemption clause.
79  The district court denied Medtronic’s motion, but shortly thereafter, the 
                                                 
74 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
75 “The lead is the portion of a pacemaker that transmits the heartbeat-steadying electrical 
signal from the ‘pulse generator’ to the heart itself.”  Id. at 480. 
76 Id. at 480-81. 
77 Id. at 481. 
78 Id. (citations omitted). 
79 Id.   Preemption under the MDA
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the statute required preemption of at least
some common-law claims brought against the manufacturer of a medical device.
 
 
 
rt 
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took the case. 
                                                
80  The case
was volleyed back to the district court, which dismissed the Lohrs’ complaint, but upon its 
return to the Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Circuit debated the language of the preemption
clause, the meaning of the word “requirement,” and the fact that the medical device in 
question had undergone only the cursory section 510(k) review process.  The Appeals Cou
concluded that the Lohrs’ design-based claims (alleging design defect under a negligence
theory or unreasonable danger under a strict liability theory) were not preempted because
FDA finding of “substantial equivalence” was not sufficient to classify as a federal 
“requirement” triggering the preemption clause of the MDA.  Recognizing that the Circuits
were divided over the scope of MDA preemption of state common-law claims, the Supreme 
Court 
  Rather than resolving the myriad confusing issues in this field, Medtronic v. Lohr 
gave us a fractured holding and may have raised just as many questions as it answered.
 81  To 
streamline our discussion of the case, this paper will address the Court’s holdings under the 
following headings: (A) does the preemption clause of the MDA apply to state common-law 
tort actions? (B) does preemption under the MDA apply to this case involving a Class III 
medical device that underwent FDA’s section 510(k) review? 
 
(A) Does the preemption clause of the MDA apply to state common-law tort actions? 
  The short answer to this question is: yes.  The Supreme Court did not repudiate its 
finding in Cipollone that the word “requirement” could extend outside the realm of positive 
 
80 Id. at 482-83. 
81 Lohr consists of an opinion by the Court (authored by Justice Stevens, and joined by 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), a plurality opinion (authored by Justice 
Stevens and joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg), a concurrence (authored by 
Justice Breyer), and a partially concurring/partially dissenting opinion (authored by Justice 
O’Connor and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas).     Preemption under the MDA
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law and encompass common-law tort claims.  It did, however, limit the sweeping reach of 
Cipollone within the context of the MDA to hold that only some state common-law tort 
claims might be preempted.  
  The Court cited Cipollone for its approach to the preemption question.
82  The express 
presumption clause of the MDA indicated that Congress intended to preempt at least some 
state law, but the Court needed to conduct further analysis to determine the “domain 
expressly pre-empted” by its language.
 83  In doing this, the Court restated two primary 
presumptions: 1) “‘that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’”
84 and 2) that 
“the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of 
congressional purpose.’”
85  This led the Court into an analysis of Congressional intent during 
the drafting of the MDA. 
  The Court found implausible Medtronic’s argument that all common-law causes of 
action were “requirements” that would impose duties “different from, or in addition to” 
general standards promulgated by FDA.  They focused on the term “requirement” itself, 
saying that “if Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a 
singularly odd word with which to do it.”
86  The Court distinguished Cipollone (in which it 
had found that a statute preempting state “requirements” could also preempt common-law 
damages claims) by saying that a similar reading of the MDA would be overbroad.  The 
statutes at issue, after all, were different.  The Court was convinced that when Congress 
enacted the MDA, it was more worried about specific, conflicting positive state law, rather 
                                                 
82 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484. 
83 Id. at 484 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (1992)). 
84 Id. at 485 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. at 230 (1947)). 
85 Id. at 485-86 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 n.27 (opinion of Stevens, J.)). 
86 Id. at 487.   Preemption under the MDA
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than the more general regulatory influence of common-law tort actions.
87  The Court also 
found that the basic purpose of the MDA was to promote safety and effectiveness of medical 
devices, and a broad reading of state tort preemption would contravene Congressional intent 
here.
88  Finally, the legislative history of the MDA convinced the Court that Congress could 
not have intended a sweeping preemptive reach.  After all, it had been well aware of ongoing 
lawsuits in the medical device arena at the time.  Thus, if the legislation was intended to 
suppress all these claims in future, it was “spectacularly odd” that no mention was made of 
such drastic reform in the debates.
89 
  The Lohrs wanted the Supreme Court to say that common-law duties would never be 
“requirements” within the meaning of § 360k(a) (thus cutting even further back on 
Cipollone), but the Court refused to reach this holding because they were able to find the 
Lohrs’ claims not preempted without going that far.
90  While all acknowledged that some 
common-law duties in future cases might be preempted, the justices disagreed on exactly how 
much preemption was intended.  The plurality opinion took into account the MDA’s language 
and history to find that the statute was not intended to preempt most damages actions.
91  This 
opinion stated that “given the critical importance of device specificity in our (and the FDA’s) 
construction of § 360k(a), it is apparent that few, if any, common-law duties have been pre-
empted by this statute.  It will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of 
action to issue a decree that has ‘the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a 
specific device.’”
92  On the other hand, Justice Breyer stated in his concurrence that he was 
“not convinced that future incidents of MDA pre-emption of common-law claims [would] be 
                                                 
87 Id. at 489. 
88 Id. at 490. 
89 Id. at 491. 
90 Id. at 502. 
91 Id. at 491. 
92 Id. at 502-03.   Preemption under the MDA
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‘few’ or ‘rare.’”
93  The dissenters criticized the Court for relying on FDA interpretations of 
the statute in a context where agency deference was unwarranted and shared Justice Breyer’s 
doubts about whether future preemption would be “rare.”
94 
  In summary, the Court found that some state common-law tort claims may be 
preempted under the MDA, but left us with little concrete guidance as to exactly how much 
tort law this decision would subsume. 
 
(B) Does preemption under the MDA apply to this case involving a Class III medical device 
that underwent FDA’s section 510(k) review? 
 
  The Court found that the Lohrs’ claims in this case were not preempted.  In order to 
reach that holding, they gave three major reasons for what would “rescue” a state common-
law tort action from the reach of § 360k(a).  The crucial factors were: (i) the specificity of 
federal regulations, (ii) the specificity of state regulations, and (iii) whether state duties 
paralleled federal ones. 
(i)  Specificity of federal regulations  
 
  The Eleventh Circuit had found the Lohrs’ defective design claims not preempted 
because the device had undergone the section 510(k) approval process before going on the 
market.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the section 510(k) process only 
involved FDA determination of the product’s “substantial equivalence” to something already 
on the market, it did not constitute a review of safety and effectiveness, and was thus not 
sufficiently concrete to constitute a “pre-empting federal requirement.”
95  The Supreme Court 
agreed with this reasoning, deducing that the section 510(k) process would allow some 
                                                 
93 Id. at 508. 
94 Id. at 511-12.  The dissenting justices believed the MDA was clear enough on its face and 
strongly criticized the importation of FDA’s “narrowing” regulations into the determination 
of preemptive scope. 
95 Id. at 492.   Preemption under the MDA
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potentially risky devices onto the market without ever having undergone formal review.
96  
The Court indicated that the word “requirements” in § 360k(a) carried some weight.  
Basically, in order for the MDA preemption clause to be triggered, a medical device 
manufacturer would need to show that it operated in a realm in which the federal government 
had imposed regulations on it that would make being subjected to potentially conflicting state 
requirements in a common-law tort action unfair. 
  The section 510(k) process was deemed inadequate to trigger the MDA preemption 
clause.  As the Court said, FDA “did not ‘require’ Medtronics’ [sic] pacemaker to take any 
particular form for any particular reason; the agency simply allowed the pacemaker, as a 
device substantially equivalent to one that existed before 1976, to be marketed without 
running the gauntlet of the PMA process.”
97  The Court found that while Congress had 
pragmatic reasons for setting up the section 510(k) process, it did not manifest any intent to 
shield device manufacturers that took advantage of this system from having to defend 
themselves against state law claims of negligent design.
98  A mere finding of “substantial 
equivalence” does not equate to a federal “requirement” for the purposes of § 360k(a). 
  The Lohrs also brought claims alleging that Medtronic had failed to comply with 
manufacturing and labeling duties under Florida common law.   The Court of Appeals had 
found these claims to be preempted because of the existence of supposedly countervailing 
federal “requirements.”  FDA has promulgated general requirements that apply to all medical 
devices.  These are called “Good Manufacturing Practices” or “GMPs” and all device 
manufacturers must comply with them.
99  The Court of Appeals found the Lohrs’ 
                                                 
96  “If the earlier device poses a severe risk or is ineffective, then the later device may also be 
risky or ineffective.”  Id. at 493 (quoting Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device 
Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J., 511, 516 (1988)).  
97 Id. at 493-94. 
98 Id. at 494. 
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manufacturing and labeling claims to be preempted because they thought that subjecting 
manufacturers to state standards that would potentially differ from the GMPs would 
“interfere with the consistent application of general federal regulations governing the labeling 
and manufacture of all medical devices.”
100  The Supreme Court, however, hinged its 
analysis on the specificity of the applicable federal “requirements.”  The MDA preemption
clause specifically states that a federal requirement must be “applicable to the device” in 
question. GMPs are of such a general nature that, like the section 510(k) process, the Court 
found them insufficient to trigger the preemption clause.
 
oning to 
ly 
                                                
101  The Court found its reas
be supported by the FDA regulations, which say that state requirements are preempted on
when FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations or…other specific requirements 
applicable to a particular device.”
102 
  In short, a majority of the Lohr Court found that a medical device needed to be 
subject to specific federal requirements in order to trigger a preemption analysis.  The Court 
admitted that if FDA had subjected the Model 4011 lead to more rigorous review, such as 
PMA, this would have been a much harder case to decide.
103 
(ii)  Specificity of state regulations  
  A majority of the Court believed that in order to be susceptible to federal preemption, 
a state requirement must have something other than mere “general applicability” and must be 
developed “with respect to” a particular medical device.
104  The Court found support for this 
finding in the FDA regulations, which state that “pre-emption [should] occur only where a 
particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest.”
105  We 
 
100 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 497. 
101 Id. at 498 
102 Id. at 498; 21 CFR § 808.1(d)(1995). 
103 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 493-94. 
104 Sayler & Thomas, supra note 22, at 199. 
105 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).   Preemption under the MDA
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have already discussed the need for specificity in the countervailing federal requirements,
106 
but now we see that the Court will look for specificity in the state requirements as well.  
  The FDA regulations indicate that state requirements of “general applicability” are 
not preempted unless they have “the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a 
specific device.”
107  The Court held that state requirements worthy of preemption are those 
developed “with respect to” medical devices and that are “different from, or in addition to” 
applicable federal requirements.
108 
  Basically, the MDA will likely not preempt state requirements that apply generally to 
all products on the market.  For example, suppose a state law was generally applicable to all 
products sold in pharmacies or supermarkets and it encompassed a medical device within its 
sweep.  Since this regulation would be one of “general applicability” and that was not 
developed “with respect to” the device, it would likely be found too non-specific to trigger 
MDA preemption.
109  The MDA will likely preempt state requirements that pertain 
specifically to medical devices and that come into conflict with existing federal regulations.  
For example, suppose a state law purported to impose a safety standard on a medical device 
even though FDA had already promulgated safety requirements for that product.  This 
regulation would be a state requirement specific to the device in question and if it was 
“different from, or in addition to” FDA standards, it would likely trigger the preemption 
clause. 
 
  One outcome of Lohr is the implication that courts will look for specificity in both the 
federal requirements and the state requirements in order to decide whether preemption under 
                                                 
106 See supra Part II(B)(i). 
107 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(i) (1995). 
108 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 500. 
109 Or would it?  See infra Part IV(B) for a discussion of Medtronic v. Riegel, in which the 
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the MDA is triggered.  The Court projected that this would likely entail a fact-specific 
inquiry, involving “careful comparison between the allegedly pre-empting federal 
requirement and the allegedly pre-empted state requirement to determine whether they fall 
within the intended pre-emptive scope of the statute and regulations.”
110 
(iii)  Parallel duties in state and federal law not preempted 
  The Court also clarified the ambiguous “different from, or in addition to” language of 
§ 360k(a) in its holding.  Some of the Lohrs’ claims were based on Florida law that would 
have imposed common-law duties that merely duplicated existing requirements under federal 
law.  For example, the Court acknowledged that an examination of the Lohrs’ negligence 
claim might involve an inquiry into whether there was negligent conduct or unreasonable 
hazard created by Medtronic in producing and distributing the Model 4011 lead.  Subjecting 
Medtronic to this analysis might mean that they would literally face “additional” elements of 
a state law cause of action, but the Court found that these made the state requirements 
narrower, not broader than the federal regulations.  The Court was dismissive of an overly 
literal reading of § 360k(a), and stated that: “[w]hile such a narrower requirement might be 
‘different from’ the federal rules in a literal sense, ‘such a difference would surely provide a 
strange reason for finding pre-emption of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal 
rule.’”
111  Essentially, the Court found that subjecting manufacturers to state requirements 
that ran parallel to federal requirements would not create the type of state/federal conflict that 
runs amok of the preemption principle.  Instead, allowing such claims would merely give 
                                                 
110 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 500.  Not all the justices agreed with this “specificity” focus though.  
The dissenters clung tightly to the logic of Cipollone in stating that the language of the MDA 
was clear enough on its face.  They heavily criticized the other justices’ searching inquiries 
beyond the text of § 360k(a) into Congressional intent and FDA regulations.  According to 
these justices, “[t]he statute makes no mention of a requirement of specificity, and there is no 
sound basis for determining that such a restriction on ‘any requirement’ exists.”  Id. at 512 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  These justices would have supported a more general 
understanding of “requirement” based solely on the text of the MDA. 
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manufacturers more of a reason to comply with identical existing requirements under federal 
law, and would thus enhance the effectiveness of the federal regulatory scheme.  The Court 
found support for this holding in the regulations promulgated by FDA, which state that § 
360k(a) “does not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially 
identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act.”
112  In short, common-law actions 
based on state requirements that merely replicate federal laws will survive preemption under 
the MDA. 
  The overarching message of Medtronic v. Lohr is that federal preemption under the 
MDA will occur “where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific 
federal interest.”
113  This entails a determination of particularity, or specificity, of both the 
state and federal requirements in question, and it entails a finding that the state requirements 
do not merely replicate obligations under federal law.  After years of lower court conflict 
surrounding the reach of the MDA’s preemption clause, Lohr had a real opportunity to 
provide concrete answers, and it did, to some extent.  One clear application of this case will 
be to lawsuits involving medical devices that have only undergone section 510(k) review as a 
precondition to marketing.
114  It seems clear now that these manufacturers will not be able to 
raise the MDA preemption defense in state common-law tort actions.  This is significant 
because, as discussed previously, the vast majority of devices on the market have only 
undergone this cursory review.  At the same time, the decision also answered the question of 
                                                 
112 Id. at 496-97 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2) (1995)).  Note that even the dissenters 
agree that parallel claims should survive preemption:  “Where a state cause of action seeks to 
enforce an FDCA requirement, that claim does not impose a requirement that is ‘different 
from, or in addition to,’ requirements under federal law.  To be sure, the threat of a damages 
remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the requirements imposed 
on them under state and federal law do not differ.  Section 360k does not preclude States from 
imposing different or additional remedies, but only different or additional requirements.” 
Lohr, 505 U.S. at 513.  
113 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 500. 
114 By extension, this case also suggests that Class I and Class II medical devices fall within 
the same rubric since they are only subject to very general federal requirements, such as 
GMPs, which were specifically found to be insufficient to trigger MDA preemption here.   Preemption under the MDA
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whether the reasoning of  Cipollone would apply to the MDA context – we now know that at 
least some state common-law claims could fall within the preemptive scope of § 360k(a). 
  In the aftermath of the decision, many commentators questioned the Court’s reasoning 
and the wisdom of its holding, and criticized the gaps that still remained in our understanding 
of the MDA’s preemptive framework.  What would Lohr mean for devices that had 
undergone the PMA or IDE process?  How “rare” would preemption of state common-law 
tort claims turn out to be?  How “specific” would a conflicting state “requirement” have to be 
to trigger the preemption clause?  How would the lower courts respond?  In Part III, we turn 
to the aftermath of Medtronic v. Lohr and the continuing confusion that eventually led to the 
Court stepping in again in Medtronic v. Riegel.   
 
Part III: Preemption under the MDA in the Years between Lohr and Riegel 
 
 In  Lohr, all the justices agreed that common-law damages claims might be preempted 
under the MDA.  However, the fractured nature of the holding left us with some confusion as 
to the extent to which state common-law claims would be preempted in future.  Recall that 
four justices believed that the MDA was “not intended to pre-empt most, let alone all general 
common-law duties enforced by damages actions.”
115  Five justices expressed a more 
expansive conception of which claims would be preempted.  Breyer’s concurrence indicated 
that he was “not convinced that future incidents of MDA pre-emption of common-law claims 
[would] be ‘few’ or ‘rare’”
116 and the dissenters openly advocated a much broader reading of 
the scope of preemption than the plurality expressed.
117  This fundamental disagreement 
between the justices made it difficult to predict exactly which types of cases would be 
preempted in the post-Lohr world. 
                                                 
115 Lohr, 505 U.S. at 491. 
116 Id. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 509 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   Preemption under the MDA
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 After  Lohr, there were those commentators who criticized the Court’s Cipollone-
inspired belief that Congress intended the word “requirements” in the MDA to subsume state 
common-law tort actions at all.  As there is a presumption against preemption unless 
Congressional intent is clear and manifest, Lohr could be viewed as a misconstruction of 
intent in the face of ambiguous language.
118  The response from the FDA certainly seemed to 
indicate disapproval of the Court’s decision. 
 
(A) The FDA Responds to Lohr 
 
  In the wake of the Lohr decision, FDA published its interpretation of the holding and 
addressed circumstances when the agency believed state requirements might fall within the 
preemptive scope of § 360k(a).
119  While FDA had historically refrained from expressing an 
opinion on private product liability suits, it felt that it needed to address the issue in light of 
the landmark ruling.  FDA embraced a narrow reading of the express preemption clause and 
stated that in order for a duty under state law to be vulnerable to preemption, “it must differ 
from or add to a ‘requirement’ [the agency] had already prescribed for the particular type of 
device.”
120  General duties applicable to all devices or to a class of devices would not be 
preempted.
121   
  FDA’s interpretation “essentially neutered [§ 360k(a)] as a source of limitation on 
state tort law.”
122  It also had the unfortunate effect of removing from the MDA’s preemptive 
scope situations to which § 360k(a) was clearly supposed to apply.  Commenters pointed out 
that FDA’s newly stated view would allow states to require and deny pre-market approval for 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 37, at 112-13. 
119 62 Fed. Reg. 65384 (Dec. 12, 1997).  
120 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1489. 
121 The agency went on to declare that a “requirement” must appear in a regulation duly 
promulgated in the Federal Register or must be imposed by an administrative order that was 
the product of a formal adjudicatory proceeding involving a specific device.  No other duties 
or conditions that FDA might impose would constitute “requirements” for purposes of § 
360k(a).  Id. 
122 Id.   Preemption under the MDA
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devices that FDA had already approved.  This would unquestionably contravene the 
underlying purpose of the MDA and eviscerate the Court’s holding in Lohr.  As a result, FDA 
withdrew the notice just over a year later.
123 
  FDA’s response to the case was confusing, at best.  It seemed to indicate the desire to 
reinstate some protection for state tort law claims.  The agency, however, was unable to tailor 
its language narrowly enough to promote consistency with Lohr and the goal of protecting 
federal interests.  Aside from the mixed signals sent by the agency, the post-Lohr period 
would be further complicated by general trends in the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine 
based on other cases involving comparable federal statutes and regulatory schemes. 
 
(B) Trends in Preemption in the Post-Lohr period   
 
  The Supreme Court had half-opened the door to preemption of state common-law 
damages claims in Cipollone.  Then, it had extended that reasoning to half-open the door to 
preemption under the MDA in Lohr.  However, the cases the Court decided in the post-Lohr 
years generated some uncertainty as to the general direction that preemption of state 
common-law claims would take next.
124 
  In 2000, the Court decided Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
125  This case 
involved regulations promulgated under a federal law governing motor vehicle safety – the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.
 126  The Act contained a preemption 
provision and a savings clause, much like the MDA.  In this case, a driver collided with a tree 
and suffered serious injuries.  Her Honda vehicle did not have an air bag, and she sued the 
                                                 
123 Id. at 1489-90; 63 Fed. Reg. 39789-01 (July 24, 1998). 
124 See generally Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and 
the FDA, B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1124-1134 (1997) (discussing post-Lohr preemption trends in 
the Supreme Court). 
125 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
126 15 U.S.C. 1392(d) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. 30103(b) (2000)).  The regulations 
were promulgated by the Department of Transportation pursuant to the authority of the Act, 
and they were referred to as the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (“FMVSS”).     Preemption under the MDA
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manufacturer in state court, alleging defective design.  The preemption issue was relevant 
because existing federal safety standards specifically permitted manufacturers to choose 
between air bags and seat belt systems.  The Court found this state tort suit preempted 
because it would subject the manufacturer to differing requirements under federal and state 
law, and would frustrate the purpose of the federal regulatory scheme.  However, Justice 
Breyer, writing for the Court, echoed his analysis in Lohr and stated that the preemption 
clause did not indicate congressional intent to defeat all product liability claims, especially 
when the federal government had only established a minimum standard of safety.
127  Geier 
was an emphatic restatement of the importance of finding actual conflict between state and 
federal requirements in order to find preemption.
128   
  In 2001, the Court decided another case involving the MDA, but it was a narrow and 
fact-specific holding that did not do much to clarify the scope of preemption as much as one 
might like.  In Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Court had to determine whether 
the MDA preempted a state action based on a defendant device manufacturer’s fraudulent 
misrepresentations to FDA in order to obtain approval for orthopedic bone screws.
129  The 
Court found that a state law-based fraud-on-the-FDA claim would conflict with FDA’s own 
authority and ability to police fraud against itself.  This shed some light on another type of 
state common-law tort claim that would be preempted, but the holding had considerably 
limited reach or predictive value. 
  In 2002, the Court decided Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, which involved preemption 
under the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (“FBSA”).
130  In this case, a woman was killed in 
a boating accident after being struck by the propellers on an outboard motor.  Her husband 
sued the boat manufacturer in state court, alleging defective design.  The manufacturer 
                                                 
127 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 870. 
128 See Davis, supra note 124, at 1124-26. 
129 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001). 
130 537 U.S. 51 (2002).   Preemption under the MDA
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argued that the FBSA expressly preempted these common-law claims, especially in light of 
the fact that the Coast Guard (charged with promulgating federal regulations in this field) had 
explicitly decided not to require propeller guards.  The language of the FBSA was similar to 
the MDA in its use of the word “requirement,”
131 making this decision illustrative of which 
common-law claims the Court would treat as worthy of preemption.  Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Stevens disposed of the manufacturer’s express preemption defense.  He stated 
that the clause was intended to apply to state or local positive laws, and that the language was 
“most naturally read as not encompassing common-law claims.”
132  Any analogy between the 
FBSA and the MDA, however, must be made cautiously because, unlike the MDA, the FBSA 
did explicitly refer to a “law or regulation” in its preemption clause.  However, in light of the 
fact that the clause went on to describe such laws and regulations as 
“imposing…requirement[s],”
133 the argument existed that this holding could counsel a 
narrower reading of tort claims triggering preemption under the MDA. 
  In 2005, the decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
134 suggested that a majority of the 
Court held a narrow view of claims that common-law duties would be preempted.  In this 
case, Texas farmers alleged that their crop had been damaged by defendant Dow’s weed 
killer, which had supposedly been promoted in a misleading manner.  Plaintiffs sought 
damages under Texas law, and defendants argued that such a claim would be preempted 
because being subjected to damages in state court would force them to change their product 
labeling.  This would have had the effect of imposing requirements “in addition to or 
                                                 
131 In relevant part, the FBSA preemption provision provided that “a State or political 
subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation 
establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety 
standard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment… that is not identical to a 
regulation prescribed [by the federal government pursuant to this Act].”  46 U.S.C. § 4306 
(emphasis added). 
132 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63.   
133 46 U.S.C. § 4306. 
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different from” federal ones, as stated in the preemption clause of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).
135  Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected the 
argument that the preemption clause precluded enforcement of any common-law duty that 
might lead a manufacturer to make changes to a product label.  The opinion stated that while 
some common-law duties might be included within the term “requirement,” such duties 
would need to “command conduct that went beyond or conflicted with the requirements [the 
federal government] imposed” in order to be preempted.
136  While making it clear that state 
requirements that would carry the force of law and compel obedience were likely to be 
preempted, the majority clarified that “an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates 
an optional decision is not a requirement.”
137  Like Sprietsma before it, this case suggested a 
trend toward more protection for state common-law tort actions than one might have 
imagined in the immediate post-Lohr era. 
 In  cases  like  Cipollone and Lohr, the Court had appeared to be cutting away at the 
protections that preemption doctrine had previously provided to state common-law damages 
actions.  However, in the post-Lohr era, cases like Sprietsma and Bates granted favorable 
treatment to “the long-standing role of tort litigation in regulating public health and safety”
138 
and they “emphasize[d] the concurrent role of the states in that regulation.”
139  Indeed, one 
commentator described Bates as “the Court…trying to put the Cipollone genie back in the 
bottle.”
140   
  Geier and Buckman seemed to at least suggest that the Court would continue to act 
carefully in finding state common-law actions preempted under federal statutes.  Bates and 
                                                 
135 The preemption clause of FIFRA states, in relevant part, that a state: “shall not impose or 
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from 
those required under this subchapter.”  7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added). 
136 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1490. 
137 Bates, 544 U.S. at 445. 
138 Davis, supra note 124, at 1133 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70). 
139 Id. 
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Sprietsma suggested a reluctance on the Court’s part to preempt state common-law tort 
actions when: (i) Congress was aware of a history of product liability litigation in the field 
prior to enacting a federal law, and (ii) preemption would deny protection to those injured by 
regulated conduct.
141  In the context of the passage of the MDA, Congress definitely knew 
about pre-existing device litigation and yet it still did not use unmistakably clear language 
preempting state tort claims in the statute.  Furthermore, the FDCA does not provide a private 
right of action.
142  Perhaps future courts were supposed to be more cautious about preempting 
state causes of action that would leave injured plaintiffs without recourse.  At the same time, 
these two cases did interpret other federal statutes, and that diminished their predictive weight 
in the medical device arena. 
  If the Supreme Court’s softer treatment of common-law claims in the post-Lohr era 
seemed puzzling, at least it was far subtler than what FDA did next. 
 
(C) FDA Changes its Mind 
 
  Recall that historically, FDA had shied away from issuing opinions on product 
liability suits at all.  After Lohr, it responded with an anti-preemption publication, which, 
although later withdrawn, did suggest that the agency viewed many state tort claims as falling 
outside the scope of the MDA’s preemption clause.  In subsequent years, however, the 
agency did an about-face.  As part of his “tort reform” campaign, President George W. Bush 
                                                 
141 Courts “must determine whether the common law duties imposed by state law are 
sufficiently direct and prescriptive to constitute ‘requirements.’  And courts must determine 
whether there was a history of product liability litigation over the regulated products prior to 
the enactment of federal law.  If there was, as there was in Bates, then the Court thought that 
if Congress intended to deprive injured parties of pre-existing compensatory remedies, it 
would do so with unmistakable clarity.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
142 The MDA does not explicitly say that Congress is seeking to nullify existing state damage 
claims, which have traditionally provided compensation to those injured by medical devices.  
Some federal statutes do explicitly eliminate the possibility of such claims, but they do so in 
unmistakable terms, and often have a federal remedy in lieu of the displaced state remedies.  
See id. at 98 n.16 (citing examples of federal statutes that provide statutory remedies when 
they explicitly preempt state tort actions).   Preemption under the MDA
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pushed executive agencies to issue broad interpretations of preemption provisions in 
regulatory statutes.
143  FDA was “on the front line of this campaign, both reversing its 
longstanding view that the MDA preemption provision applies only in exceptional 
circumstances, and aggressively presenting its new pro-preemption views in court.”
144  
  This change of heart was surprising, but not necessarily determinative of how courts 
would respond.  As a matter of administrative law, courts do not always necessarily owe 
deference to an agency’s view of the scope of a federal preemption clause (although the 
Court in Lohr did rely heavily on FDA regulatory language in defining “requirements”).
145  
Additionally, even though FDA changed its publicly acknowledged position on preemption, 
it did not formally amend its regulations to reflect the change of heart.  As a result, the 
agency’s officially regulations still counseled narrow application of § 360k(a) amidst its pro-
preemption publicity campaign.
146 
 
(D) The Courts Respond Inconsistently  
 
  With the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence counseling caution and FDA’s 
position on preemption changing entirely, it should come as no surprise that the lower courts 
responded inconsistently in deciding the scope of preemption of state common-law tort 
claims brought after Lohr.   
                                                 
143 Id. at 121. 
144 See id. (citing example of Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Vladeck 
also points out that in the post-Bush tort reform era, FDA has “accomplished a complete 
transformation of its position on the preemptive scope of the MDA and has actively solicited 
guidance from pharmaceutical and medical device firms about pending lawsuits in which [it] 
could participate to press its pro-preemption position.”  Id. at 122 (citation omitted). 
145 When Congressional intent is clear in the statute itself, the Court does not owe an agency 
any deference in construing the law.  It is only when a statute is ambiguous that a Court 
should accord weight to agency construction – a practice typically referred to as “Chevron 
deference.”  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984).  See also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for according deference to FDA position on the scope of preemption under the MDA 
because, “[w]here the language of the statute is clear, resort to the agency’s interpretation is 
improper.”)  
146 Id. at 124-25.   Preemption under the MDA
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  Most courts had no trouble rejecting manufacturers’ preemption defenses in cases 
where devices had only undergone section 510(k) review, as in Lohr.
147  Courts struggled 
more with deciding how Lohr was meant to apply to devices that had undergone the PMA or 
IDE process though, and differing results abounded.
148 
  Pro-plaintiff commentators praised Lohr as drastically diminishing the viability of the 
preemption defense for device manufacturers.
149  Pro-defendant commentators saw Lohr’s 
bark as worse than its bite, and thought its circumscribed application posed little threat to the 
medical device industry.
150  Based on the Court’s heavy reliance on the cursory and status 
quo-preserving nature of the section 510(k) process in finding the Lohrs’ claims not 
preempted, it seemed very possible that cases involving devices that had undergone the 
“rigorous, regulation-intensive, and device-specific PMA and IDE processes” might produce 
a different result.
151  It quickly became clear that it would be appropriate and even necessary 
for the Supreme Court to hear a PMA case to clear up the confusion about what Lohr meant 
                                                 
147 Sayler & Thomas, supra note 22, at 201 n.77 (listing string of post-Lohr cases that have 
rejected preemption defense). 
148 Id. at 202-04, n.89 (listing string of cases in which differing results were reached in cases 
where device in question had undergone PMA).  See also Vladeck, supra note 37, at 99.  
(“The contours of the Court’s ruling in Medtronic are unclear and hotly disputed, and there 
has been a flood of conflicting lower cases in Medtronic’s aftermath attempting to draw a line 
between those claims preempted by the MDA and those claims that are not preempted.”) 
149 “In Medtronic v. Lohr, the Supreme Court gave control of common-law product liability 
lawsuits for defective medical devices back to the States, and effectively eliminated one of 
the only defenses left for medical device manufacturers. If the cost of defending these actions 
becomes prohibitively high, the practical result may be a halt in the advances in technology 
for medical devices. Additionally, the differing opinions of the Supreme Court in this case 
raise the question of when, if ever, common-law claims will be pre-empted in the future.”  
Rosemary V. Bourne, Medtronic v. Lohr: State Common-Law Claims Involving Class III 
Medical Devices Are Not Pre-Empted by The Medical Device Amendments Of 1976, 27 U. 
BALT. L. F. 39, 41 (1996). 
150 “While the opinion's holding is adverse to defendants, its reach is suspect. The amount of 
attention devoted to the lenient nature of the section 510(k) process suggests that the holding 
warrants narrow application. Thus, the medical device industry must be wary of adversaries’ 
attempts to exaggerate the impact of the opinion.”  Sayler & Thomas, supra note 22, at 207.  
151 Id. at 200.   Preemption under the MDA
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outside the section 510(k) realm.  Twelve years after Lohr, it finally took the opportunity, and 
granted certiorari to Medtronic v. Riegel.
152   
 
Part IV: Medtronic v. Riegel 
 
 The  Riegel Court was poised to answer many questions that had cropped up during 
the decade that had passed since Lohr.  Would the Court use the underlying message of Bates 
and Sprietsma to repudiate Cipollone and beef up protection for common-law tort actions?  
Or would they instead reaffirm Cipollone and expand the scope of preemption under the 
MDA?  What weight, if any, would they give to FDA’s change of heart?  Most practically, 
what would be the status of the preemption defense for manufacturers whose devices had 
undergone the rigorous PMA process, instead of just section 510(k) review? 
  In May 1996, after having suffered a heart attack, Charles Riegel underwent an 
angioplasty – a procedure in which his surgeon attempted to dilate his right coronary artery.  
Riegel’s artery was diffusely diseased and heavily calcified, but the surgeon successfully 
inserted a Medtronic-manufactured Evergreen Balloon catheter.
153  The catheter was a Class 
III device that had been FDA-approved in 1994 after undergoing the PMA process.
154  
During inflation of the catheter, the device burst and Mr. Riegel developed a heart block.  He 
was placed on life support and underwent emergency coronary bypass surgery.
155  Riegel and 
his wife brought a lawsuit in a New York federal district court, complaining that Medtronic’s 
catheter was “designed, labeled and manufactured in a manner that violated New York 
common law” and that as a result of these defects, Charles Riegel had suffered permanent 
                                                 
152 128 S. Ct. 1999 (2008). 
153 The labeling on the Evergreen Balloon Catheter stated that its use was contraindicated in 
patients with “diffuse or calcified stenoses.”  The label also warned against inflating the 
catheter beyond its rated burst pressure of eight atmospheres, but the physician inflated it to a 
pressure of 10 atmospheres.  Id. at 1005. 
154 Id. 
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injury.
156  The Riegels raised a number of common-law claims, and the district court found 
them all either to be preempted under the MDA or granted summary judgment to Medtronic. 
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holdings, finding that Medtronic was “‘clearly subject to the federal, device-specific 
requirement of adhering to the standards contained in its individual, federally approved’ 
premarket approval application.”
157  The Second Circuit reasoned that the Riegels’ claims 
had to be preempted because if they prevailed on them, the verdicts would have “‘impose[d] 
state requirements that differed from, or added to’ the device-specific federal 
requirements.”
158  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
159 
 Since  Cipollone, Lohr, and other preemption cases in that line had already established 
that the word “requirements” in the MDA preemption clause could be read to include state 
common-law tort claims, the Court in Riegel proceeded directly to the two-part test for 
determining whether the claims at issue in this case were preempted.  To streamline our 
discussion of the case, I will address the Court’s holdings under the following headings: (A) 
did the federal government establish requirements applicable to the Evergreen Balloon within 
the meaning of § 360k(a) of the MDA? (B) did the Riegels’ common-law claims rely upon 
any “requirements” under New York law that were specific enough to invoke § 360k(a) 
preemption? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 Id. at 1006. 
157 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Riegel, 451 F.3d 104, 118 (2d. Cir. 2006)). 
158 Id.  (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Riegel, 451 F.3d 104, 121 (2d. Cir. 2006)). 
159 In the time between the initial filing of the complaint and the Supreme Court case, Charles 
Riegel died.  The Court recognized his wife as petitioner and, for simplicity’s sake, it drew no 
formal distinction between Charles Riegel and his estate in the opinion.  Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 
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(A) Did the federal government establish requirements applicable to the Evergreen Balloon 
within the meaning of § 360k(a) of the MDA? 
 
  The majority opinion addressed this question first because the MDA expressly 
preempts only “state requirements ‘different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable…to [a] device’ under federal law.”
160  The Court reiterated its findings in Lohr, 
which had been “substantially informed” by FDA regulations that extended the reach of the 
MDA preemption clause only to those situations where FDA has established specific 
requirements to govern the device in question.
161  In Lohr, the federal “requirements” at issue 
were judged to be non-specific because the abbreviated section 510(k) process reflected 
“entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally.”
162  In this case, however, the 
medical device had not merely undergone section 510(k) review; it had gone through the full 
PMA process. 
  Focusing on the rigorous, thorough, and time-consuming nature of PMA, the Court 
declared that in contrast to the section 510(k) process, “[PMA] imposes ‘requirements’ under 
the MDA as we interpreted it in Lohr.”
163  Unlike the generally applicable GMPs that govern 
Class I, Class II, and “grandfathered” Class III devices, PMA involves the imposition of 
requirements specific to the individual devices reviewed.  Section 510(k) review focuses on 
equivalence, not safety, whereas PMA focuses on safety, not equivalence.
164  Because of the 
vast difference in the quantity and quality of review that FDA grants under the two pre-
market review processes, the Court found that the PMA process met the “specificity” 
requirement laid out in Lohr.  Thus, Class III devices that have undergone PMA are subject to 
federal “requirements” within the meaning of the MDA.   
 
                                                 
160 Id. at 1006 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)). 
161 Id. (relying on 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)). 
162 Id. (quoting Lohr, 518 US at 501).   
163 Id. at 1007. 
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(B) Did the Riegels’ common-law claims rely upon any “requirements” under New York law 
that are specific enough to invoke § 360k(a) preemption? 
 
  Whereas the first prong of the test involved the Court determining the specificity of 
the federal requirements to which the device was subject, the second prong required an 
examination of the specificity of the state requirements at issue.  The key question was 
whether the Riegels’ common-law claims relied upon “any requirement” of New York law 
applicable to the Evergreen Balloon catheter that was “‘different from, or in addition to’ 
federal requirements and that ‘relate[d] to the safety or effectiveness of the device.’”
165  In 
short, were New York’s tort-based common-law duties also “requirements” within the 
meaning of the MDA? 
  Again, the Court cited its reasoning in cases like Cipollone and Bates, which had 
resulted in finding some common-law actions preempted.  According to Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion, “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its 
common-law duties.”  A liability award in a tort case “‘can be, indeed is designed to be, a 
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.’”
166  The Court found that if, 
under state tort law, the catheter would have needed to be safer and thus potentially less 
effective than the model that FDA approved, such a common-law duty would “disrupt[] the 
federal scheme no less than state regulatory laws to the same effect.
167  Along these lines, the 
Court reasoned that state common-law duties that flew in the face of federal requirements as 
specific as those entailed in the PMA process were likely to fall within the scope of 
preemption. 
                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1008 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521). 
167 The Court indicated that such common-law duties might warrant even less protection than 
preemption from regulations promulgated by state agencies and legislatures (which are 
clearly preempted by § 360k), because of the lay and unpredictable nature of jury verdicts.  
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  The Court did take note of FDA’s shift from an anti-preemption stance in the 
immediate post-Lohr era to a pro-preemption stance in more recent years.  However, the 
Court found it unnecessary to place any official weight on the agency’s opinion because the 
statute was determined to be clear on its face.
168  In terms of whether FDA’s turnabout would 
have had any impact on the Court’s interpretation had they needed agency advice, the Court 
noted that the degree of deference they would have accorded “might be reduced by the fact 
that the agency’s earlier position was different.”
169 
  The Riegels argued that the state common-law duties on which their claims relied 
were not specific enough to trigger the preemption clause of the MDA.  After all, general tort 
law duties are not promulgated “with respect to devices.”  The Court summarily dismissed 
this argument though, finding that there was nothing in the statute to indicate that the state 
requirement at issue had to apply only to the medical device in question or only to medical 
devices as a category.
170  The Court thus found the Riegels’ claims to be preempted under the 
MDA. 
    
  In conclusion, the Court explicitly reiterated one remaining avenue for relief, which it 
had also noted in Lohr – nothing in the MDA would prevent a state from providing a 
damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations.  Basically, as long 
as the state duties under which a tort claim was brought ran parallel to the federal regulations, 
rather than adding to them, such a claim would survive preemption.  Unfortunately, the 
Riegels waived the argument that their complaint alleged parallel claims by not raising it in 
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the lower courts or in their petition for certiorari.  As a result, the Court was unable to address 
whether their claims could have survived in this category.
171   
  Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he emphasized his interpretation 
of the underlying purpose of the MDA.  He believed it was enacted to provide additional 
protection to consumers, and not to withdraw existing protections.  At the same time, he 
concurred that the Riegels’ claims were preempted.  Much as he thought that Congress was 
originally concerned with conflicting state statutes and regulations when it drafted the MDA 
preemption clause, the fact remained that the language could be plausibly read to include 
other “requirements” such as those imposed by state common-law duties.  In this case, he felt 
that the Riegels’ claims were premised on New York common-law duties that triggered the 
“different from” language of the MDA and that related to the safety and effectiveness of the 
Evergreen Catheter.  In light of the specific federal requirements with which these common-
law duties would conflict, such claims were worthy of preemption within the language of the 
clause.
172 
  Ginsburg’s dissent took issue with the Court’s construal of Congressional intent in 
enacting the MDA.  Even though she had admitted in Lohr that the language of the 
preemption clause could be read to encompass some state common-law duties, she cautioned 
against the “sweeping preemption of mine-run claims for relief under state tort law” that the 
Riegel majority now endorsed.
173  She posited that the narrow forms of relief that would still 
be available in the post-Riegel era would not help consumers injured by devices that received 
FDA approval, but that later proved to be unsafe.  The MDA’s failure to create any federal 
compensatory remedy for this category of sufferers suggested to her that Congress could not 
have intended to preempt state common-law suits so broadly, especially if they were 
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grounded on allegations independent of FDA requirements.
174  Ginsburg found it “‘difficult 
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse’ for 
large numbers of consumers injured by defective medical devices.”
175  In her consumer-
protective analysis of Congressional intent, she considered the regulatory regime that 
predated the enactment of the MDA.  Before 1976, many of the states had installed their own 
medical device control regimes, and she saw this as the motivating factor for Congress’ 
decision to include § 360k(a) in the law, rather than any specific plan to suppress tort suits.
176  
  Ginsburg concluded by pointing out that even if the Court had not chosen to read § 
360k(a) as an automatic bar to state common-law claims, it would not necessarily have 
rendered moot the fact that the Evergreen Balloon catheter had undergone PMA review.  
Express preemption under the statute was not the only defense a device manufacturer could 
assert.  Instead, Medtronic could have asserted conflict preemption; if it could identify an 
actual conflict between the plaintiffs’ theory of the case and the FDA’s approval of the device 
following PMA review, the tort claim may have still been preempted.  Because Medtronic did 
not advance this argument, however, the Court did not address this possibility.
177  Another 
way in which the PMA process could be relevant is if the manufacturer used it to present a 
regulatory compliance defense.  Essentially, Medtronic could have presented the fact that 
FDA approved its device as prima facie evidence that it used due care in product design and 
labeling.  Ginsburg acknowledged that the regulatory compliance defense was not dispositive 
in most states; it would just be one of many factors for the jury to consider.  Nonetheless, 
these were valid examples of instances in which the preemption defense for manufacturers 
could have survived even if the Court had adopted a more narrow reading of the scope of 
express preemption under § 360k(a).  Ginsburg’s dissent indicated clear disapproval of the 
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Court’s rationale and its holding, stating that “[t]he constriction of state authority ordered 
today was not mandated by Congress and is at odds with the MDA’s central purpose: to 
protect consumer safety.”
178 
  Partially in response to Ginsburg’s scathing dissent, Scalia’s opinion expressly stated 
that it was not the Court’s job to “speculate upon congressional motives.”
179  Even if such an 
inquiry into Congressional intent were necessary though, the Court said that the only reliable 
indicator of Congressional intent available to them was the text of the statute itself.  As the 
majority saw it, the MDA’s text implied that any “solicitude [Congress may have had] for 
those injured by FDA-approved devices…was overcome in Congress’s estimation by 
solicitude for those who would suffer without medical devices if juries were allowed to apply 
the tort law of 50 States to all innovations.”
180  
 In  sum,  Riegel provides immunity to manufacturers whose products have undergone 
PMA review.  If FDA has approved a device’s design and labeling in the PMA process, an 
injured plaintiff can no longer bring a tort suit against the manufacturer in state court alleging 
design or labeling defect.  Riegel thus explicitly expands the scope of preemption under the 
MDA to cut off an avenue of relief for a subset of injured victims.  After this case, the only 
damages remedies available in state courts are for claims that allege that the manufacturer 
violated FDA regulations in the design and marketing of the device. 
 
Part V: Post-Riegel Wranglings 
 
 Before  Riegel, most jurisdictions that had confronted the issue had already held that § 
360k(a) of the MDA preempted conflicting state common-law claims arising from the design, 
                                                 
178 Id. at 1020. 
179 Id. at 1009. 
180 Id.    Preemption under the MDA
Jijón 44
manufacture, and labeling of a medical device that had undergone PMA.
181  Riegel thus 
provided resounding support for their holdings.  Even though the case did not explicitly 
address what would have happened if the medical device had entered the market after the 
IDE process, the Riegel rationale supports a prediction that state tort claims in this context 
will likely be preempted as well.
182  The IDE process, much like PMA, is a very rigorous and 
fact-intensive investigation on FDA’s part, and this would most likely result in a court 
finding such a device to be subject to adequately specific federal “requirements” within the 
meaning of the MDA.   
 The  holding  in  Riegel does not suggest, as some commentators predicted prior to the 
case, that the Court is taking a particularly “narrow view of claims that common-law duties 
are preempted.”
183  In fact, while Lohr merely suggested that some common-law duties might 
be preempted, Riegel actually defines a category of claims in which plaintiffs will be denied 
judicial relief.   
 The  Riegel decision is so new that it is too early to tell the full extent of the case’s 
impact.  Exactly how many plaintiffs will have their cases dismissed?  How many device 
manufacturers will prevail on summary judgment in the immediate aftermath of this holding?  
The numbers suggest that while the rationale and holding in Riegel are pro-defendant, the 
statistical impact the case will make is slight.  Recall that section 510(k) remains the 
dominant mode of market entry for Class III devices, and under Lohr, plaintiffs can still bring 
state common-law based tort claims in these cases.
184  As a result, Riegel may still allow the 
                                                 
181 Joyce B. Margarce & Michelle R. Scheiffele, Is the Preemption Defense for PMA-
Approved Medical Devices in Jeopardy? 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 12 n.1 (citing cases in the 
2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits, Texas, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania that had 
already issued rulings consistent with Riegel). 
182 Carrier, supra note 33, at 560. 
183 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1490. 
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vast majority of claims involving Class III devices to proceed.  The one arena in which the 
holding represents a real judicial shutout is in the category of devices that are approved by 
FDA after PMA.  While these devices are a statistical minority, they are still prevalent and 
some do cause catastrophic injury.
185  Also, even though the number of PMA devices 
approved per year is comparatively small, FDA handles hundreds of “supplements” to 
existing PMAs that reflect design or manufacture changes to devices already on the market.  
Numerous lower court decisions say such supplements have the same legal status as the 
original approvals, even though they often receive less thorough review and are approved in a 
matter of weeks.
186  The Riegel case may thus impact cases involving devices that were 
altered after mere supplementary review as well.  Even though Riegel leaves avenues of relief 
open for many plaintiffs injured by Class III devices, how do we feel about the fact that 
patients like Charles Riegel will have no legal recourse?  Does Riegel strike an optimal 
balance between federal goals and states’ rights, or between medical innovation and 
consumer safety? 
  In this author’s opinion, preemption in the post-Riegel world is probably not the 
regime that Congress intended when it enacted the MDA.
187  The Court seems to have taken 
a wrong turn as far back as Cipollone, or at least as far back as Lohr, when it imported the 
logic of Cipollone to the context of the MDA in finding that “requirements” could encompass 
                                                                                                                                                        
Medtronic, Inc. v. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179) (asserting that 99% of of Class 
III devices enter the market via the 510(k) process). 
185 “Daily front-page stories about harmful medical devices on the market such as defective 
Guidant defibrillators, Medtronic and Baxter infusion pumps, and Johnson & Johnson Boston 
Scientific heart stents, raise serious questions about the ability of the FDA approval process 
to provide adequate assurance of safety by itself.”  Vladeck, supra note 37, at 101-02.  See 
also Barnaby J. Feder, Medical Device Ruling Redraws Lines on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
22, 2008, at C2, available at 2008 WLNR 3482978 (listing examples of cases pending in the 
post-Riegel world that are in danger of dismissal). 
186 Feder, supra note 185, at C2.  
187 “There is not a hint in the legislative history of the MDA that Congress intended that the 
amendments would restrict the right of injured persons to bring state law damage actions for 
compensation.”  Vladeck, supra note 37, at 103 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490-91 & nn.12 & 
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state common-law duties.  In light of the fact that the Court began its express preemption 
analyses with broad statements about the importance of state sovereignty and the presumpt
that Congress does not “cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action,”
ion 
dd 
                                                
188 it seems very o
indeed that it went on to expand the scope of preemption under the MDA in the absence of 
clear Congressional guidance.  The Court itself admitted that there was no evidence that 
Congress contemplated extinguishing state common-law tort claims with the insertion of § 
360k(a).
189  Especially in light of the litigation-heavy, consumer safety-focused period of 
time in which the MDA was enacted, it seems exceedingly strange that Congress would work 
such a change on future injured plaintiffs without using language that was unmistakably 
clearer than present-day § 360k(a).  Aside from the lack of concrete evidence of intent in the 
Congressional record, the fact remains that FDA regulations (poorly worded though they may 
be) showed that the agency did not believe state common-law tort claims fell within the 
preemptive reach of § 360k(a).  One would think that the combination of non-intent and 
contrary intent from both Congress and the agency vested with the power to enforce the 
relevant statute would be enough to persuade the Court that common-law claims fell outside 
the reach of this preemption clause.
190   
 
188 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. 
189 “There is, to the best of our knowledge, nothing in the hearings, the committee reports, or 
the debates suggesting that any proponent of the legislation intended a sweeping pre-emption 
of traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors of defective 
devices. If Congress intended such a result, its failure even to hint at it is spectacularly odd, 
particularly since Members of both Houses were acutely aware of ongoing product liability 
litigation.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 491. 
190  Perhaps though, even those who would argue that Congress did not intend the MDA 
preemption clause to subsume the important functions of state tort law should take solace in 
the fact that Lohr: (a) restricted Cipollone to its facts, and (b) conducted an analysis of 
requirement specificity that resulted in saving the Lohrs’ claims from preemption.  In that 
sense, even though Lohr might be criticized for opening the door to federal preemption of 
state law claims in the absence of clear Congressional intent, it may simultaneously be 
commended for not running amok with Cipollone’s language and finding all common-law 
tort claims preempted.     Preemption under the MDA
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  Another indication of a judicial misstep was the Lohr Court’s newly minted two-part 
test to determine which common-law actions would fall within the scope of the MDA 
preemption clause.  In light of the “assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the [MDA] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress,”
191 it seems surprising that the Court would need to develop its own test to 
distinguish those “requirements” worthy of preemption from those that were not.  If Congress 
did not make such a distinction clear enough in the statute, the Court was disingenuous in 
trying to invent its own system to add clarity.   
  Even though this author believes Lohr was a mistake to begin with, there are 
problems with MDA preemption doctrine even if we assume that that case was rightly 
decided.  The Riegel decision conflicts with the language in Lohr in crucial ways that suggest 
that the Court should be aware of its own inconsistencies.  For example, the Court in Lohr 
stated that “‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption 
case.”
192  Scalia’s majority opinion in Riegel, in contrast, stated that it was “not [the Court’s] 
job to speculate upon congressional motives” in determining the scope of the MDA 
preemption clause.
193  Another example of contradictory reasoning was the fact that the Lohr 
and Riegel Courts disagreed over the clarity of the MDA’s text.  The Lohr Court admitted to 
finding ambiguity in the statutory wording.
 194  It needed to import legislative history, 
reasoning from other cases like Cipollone, and relevant FDA regulations to make sense of the 
language.
195  The Riegel Court, however, stated that the MDA itself was clear and 
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unambiguous enough to be read without reliance on either legislative history or FDA 
guidance.
196  A final example of inconsistency would be the Court’s shifting perspective on 
what Congress’ use of an admittedly “broad” term in the MDA – “requirements” – should 
mean.  A plurality of the Lohr Court counseled caution against a sweeping interpretation, 
saying that “if Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a 
singularly odd word with which to do it.”
197  The Riegel majority, however, interpreted 
Congress’ use of broad language far more openly, declaring that “in the context of this 
legislation [,] excluding common-law duties from the scope of pre-emption would make little 
sense.”
198  Essentially, the Court exhibited crucial shifts in reasoning between Lohr and 
Riegel, which should make us hesitant to embrace the final output of these decisions as 
perfectly cogent and doctrinally sound. 
  Next, even if we embraced the holding of Lohr, the Court’s application of the Lohr 
two-part test to the facts of Riegel was suspect.  Recall that the test required the Court to 
consider the specificity of both the federal requirements to which the medical device was 
subject, and the state requirements that the tort suit would allegedly impose on the 
manufacturer if such a suit were allowed to proceed.  In Lohr, the section 510(k) process was 
found to be inadequately rigorous to constitute a specific set of federal requirements.  In 
Riegel, PMA review was deemed to be far more specific.  While such a distinction seemed 
                                                                                                                                                        
simply because of the statutory ambiguity. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is fully 
responsible for administering the MDA…That responsibility means informed agency 
involvement and, therefore, special understanding of the likely impact of both state and 
federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to which) state 
requirements may interfere with federal objectives.”  Id. at 506. 
196 “We have found it unnecessary to rely upon that agency view because we think the statute 
itself speaks clearly to the point at issue.  If, however, we had found the statute ambiguous 
and had accorded the agency's current position deference, the dissent is correct…that -- 
inasmuch as mere Skidmore deference would seemingly be at issue -- the degree of deference 
might be reduced by the fact that the agency's earlier position was different.”  Riegel, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1009. 
197 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487. 
198 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.   Preemption under the MDA
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plausible and sound, the Riegel Court’s analysis of the second prong of the test was not.  In 
Lohr, the Court found that since the general state common-law duties on which the Lohrs’ 
complaint rested were not generated “with respect to” medical devices, they were not specific 
enough to impose “requirements” on the device within the meaning of the MDA.
199  Yet in 
Riegel, the Court switched without explanation to an effects-based test of whether the state 
requirements were specific enough.  The Court found that since the New York common-law 
duties on which the Riegels’ complaint rested would have the effect of imposing different 
substantive requirements on a medical device, it did not matter whether or not they were 
developed “with respect to” devices specifically or not – they would be preempted.
200  This 
tortured application of the test gives us reason to question whether specificity of the state 
requirements was ever important at all in evaluating of the scope of MDA preemption.  In the 
post-Riegel world, it seems as though the test may have only one prong.  Provided that the 
federal requirements are specific enough, state tort suits will likely be preempted, regardless 
of how general the allegedly conflicting state common-law duties are. 
  Aside from the inconsistencies in the Court’s treatment of preemption under the 
MDA, we cannot ignore the strange about-face performed by FDA as well.  In the pre-Lohr 
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developed ‘with respect to’ medical devices. Accordingly, they are not the kinds of 
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fire prevention regulations and zoning codes, or to use due care in the training and 
supervision of a work force. These state requirements therefore escape pre-emption, not 
because the source of the duty is a judge-made common-law rule, but rather because their 
generality leaves them outside the category of requirements that § 360k envisioned to be 
‘with respect to’ specific devices such as pacemakers.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. 501-02. 
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era and in the immediate aftermath of the case, FDA supported a much narrower reading of § 
360k(a) than the one espoused by the Supreme Court.  Remarkably, by the time the Supreme 
Court decided Riegel, the agency had changed its outlook and was suddenly in favor of a very 
broad reading of the claims the MDA should preempt.  What should we make of this change?  
While the Lohr Court’s decision was substantially informed by the FDA regulations at the 
time, the Riegel Court claimed not to accord the agency’s unofficial position any deference.  
One might wonder whether this was even true, considering the fact that the Court’s own 
viewpoint on the scope of MDA preemption seemed to expand along with FDA’s from Lohr 
to Riegel.  Regardless of how one feels about the agency’s change, it does suggest that 
something may be amiss, and the chances of the MDA’s underlying purpose having been 
misconstrued or being misconstrued in future are great. 
  Inconsistencies in the Court and the agency positions aside, one may ask whether the 
post-Riegel landscape is a good place to be from a policy perspective.  A pro-defendant 
argument would be that a generous reading of § 360k(a) is necessary to protect manufacturers 
from inconsistent treatment and conflicting requirements in state courts, thus promoting a 
coherent federal regulatory scheme that will foster medical innovation.  Under this viewpoint, 
preemption is good and will result in wide benefits being realized by consumers.  Preemption 
is not necessarily the enemy of consumer safety under the modern regime because devices 
that are not heavily regulated by FDA (such as Class I, Class II, and section 510(k)-reviewed 
Class III devices) are still open battlegrounds for state lawsuits.  Also not preempted are tort 
suits that enforce state common-law duties that merely replicate the federal requirements.  In 
this way, provided that we trust FDA to regulate medical devices, the current view of the 
preemption clause does not endanger anyone.  Manufacturers like Medtronic argue that “the 
preemptive effect of the PMA process enhances the safety of medical devices” by 
incentivizing manufacturers to subject their products to the rigorous PMA process rather than   Preemption under the MDA
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the substantially more relaxed section 510(k) notification process.
201  The argument is that if, 
by undergoing PMA review, manufacturers will essentially be shielded from the prospect of 
state product liability lawsuits, they will be more likely to submit to thorough review than 
merely taking the section 510(k) shortcut.  The resulting higher number of devices 
undergoing PMA review will mean enhanced safety of devices on the marketplace. 
  From a pro-plaintiff standpoint, it seems as though the current broad reading of § 
360k(a) deprives parties injured by unsafe medical devices of much-needed legal recourse.  
Even though PMA review is supposed to be thorough and rigorous, the fact remains that it is 
heavily dependent on data submitted by the device manufacturers themselves, and these may 
exclude unfavorable results.  On top of that, FDA is chronically underfunded,
202 requiring it 
to rely on user fees paid by manufacturers to fund the market review process – a practice 
which could influence agency approval.
203  Even if the federal government has consumers’ 
best interests at heart, it simply may not have the resources to safeguard the public from 
dangerous medical devices all by itself.
204  Another concern is that the post-Riegel landscape 
will not even provide injured plaintiffs with the few avenues for legal relief that supposedly 
do remain open.  For example, even though plaintiffs are still allowed to bring state tort suits 
alleging that a device manufacturer violated federal requirements, Riegel may result in judges 
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dismissing these cases before plaintiffs’ lawyers can gain enough evidence via discovery to 
prove such violations.
205  The resulting effect may be sweeping preemption of substantially 
all lawsuits involving Class III medical devices.  There are reasons to believe that the “tort 
and regulatory systems [can] operate in tandem and place separate, albeit reinforcing, 
disciplines on the market.”
206  Tort litigation can operate to fill gaps in the regulatory scheme 
that agencies cannot fill by themselves.
207  For these reasons, perhaps our current 
understanding of preemption under the MDA has tipped the balance too much towards 
federal control and manufacturer immunity, and too far away from the underlying goal of 
protecting the public from dangerous and defective medical devices. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
  It has been a long time since we saw them, but let us return to our Jane and John Doe, 
waking up in the world after Riegel.  Jane’s company is thrilled and tells her to start drafting 
summary judgment motions by the dozen.  So many lawsuits have simply evaporated 
overnight because, after all, Acme’s joints were PMA-approved.  Jane goes out to celebrate 
her good fortune.  John phones a lawyer to inquire about his chances of prevailing in a 
product liability suit against Acme.  The plaintiffs’ lawyer on the other end of the line has 
been on the phone all morning, breaking the bad news gently to dozens of unsuspecting 
clients whose own lawsuits against medical device manufacturers were pending.  John finds it 
difficult to believe that he can’t hold Acme accountable for his current medical condition.  
How is it that they can just hide behind a review process that clearly didn’t even work?   
  There is a glimmer of hope – perhaps he can sue Acme for improperly manufacturing 
the joint – building it to specifications different from the ones that FDA authorized.  But the 
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lawyer tells John that even this is a long shot.  They would need to get their hands on lots of 
evidence to even make the case seem plausible…but they can try.  John, exhausted and 
embittered, decides that the slim chance is not worth the expense and hassle of litigation.  He 
hangs up the phone and shakes his head in disbelief. 
 The  post-Riegel world is still brand new, and it is very possible that major 
developments are just around the corner.  There is, in fact, hope that the author of it all – 
Congress – will step in again to clear up the mess that courts and FDA have made of § 
360k(a).  As Senator Ted Kennedy said when he proposed the MDA, the law was “written so 
that the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer.  After all it is the consumer who 
pays with his health and his life for medical device malfunctions.”
208   Right after the Court 
announced its decision in Riegel, Senator Kennedy and Representative Henry Waxman (who 
was also instrumental in the passage of the MDA in 1976) joined together to say that the 
ruling was contrary to Congress’s intent and that they would introduce legislation to overturn 
it.
209  The real challenge Congress will face is in drafting language that will leave no room 
for doubt this time.  Thankfully, there is a plethora of court cases to guide legislators on how 
not to be misinterpreted again
  Jane Doe and Acme may be safe for the moment, and John Doe may suffer in relative 
silence.  But there is reason to believe that Riegel is not the last we will hear of preemption 
under the MDA, and the tables may turn again sooner than we think. 
 
208 121 CONG. REC. 10688 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
209 Feder, supra note 185, at C2.  